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Fair Coalitions for Power-Aware
Routing in Wireless Networks
Ratul K. Guha, Student Member, IEEE, Carl A. Gunter, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Saswati Sarkar, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Several power-aware routing schemes have been developed for wireless networks under the assumption that nodes are
willing to sacrifice their power reserves in the interest of the network as a whole. But, in several applications of practical utility, nodes
are organized in groups, and as a result, a node is willing to sacrifice in the interest of other nodes in its group but not necessarily for
nodes outside its group. Such groups arise naturally as sets of nodes associated with a single owner or task. We consider the premise
that groups will share resources with other groups only if each group experiences a reduction in power consumption. Then, the groups
may form a coalition in which they route each other’s packets. We demonstrate that sharing between groups has different properties
from sharing between individuals and investigate fair, mutually beneficial sharing between groups. In particular, we propose a paretoefficient condition for group sharing based on max-min fairness called fair coalition routing. We propose distributed algorithms for
computing the fair coalition routing. Using these algorithms, we demonstrate that fair coalition routing allows different groups to
mutually beneficially share their resources.
Index Terms—Wireless communication, algorithm design and analysis, energy-aware systems and routing.
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1

INTRODUCTION

W

IRELESS networks typically consist of nodes that must
discharge increasingly complex computing and communication functionalities despite rigorous constraints on
power, bandwidth, size, and memory. Significant progress
has been made to improve hardware to address these needs
and much is being done to develop software that uses
techniques like power-optimizing algorithms. Comparatively less has been done to exploit sharing among nodes as
a way to address these challenges. This is unfortunate, since
sharing can yield great benefits. A variety of challenges
impede progress:

determining which resources can be shared,
deciding when to share resources, as sharing would
evidently involve a cost,
3. deciding with whom to share resources, and
4. determining how to share resources.
Often, groups of nodes rather than individual nodes are
basic entities in the sharing mechanism. The resource
expenditure/utilization of the group as a whole is more
important than that of a single node or the entire network.
Groups are often formed on the basis of membership in an
organization or a shared task. For example, employees of an
1.
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organization A may carry wearable computers that belong
to A. When these devices form an ad hoc network, they may
share resources with other devices with the objective of
minimizing the total resource consumed by the devices in
A, rather than that of all devices in the network. Thus, the
devices belonging to an organization form a natural group.
Wearable computers involved in one distributed computation may form a group. In a sensor network, different
groups would consist of sensors that monitor different
attributes such as temperature, pressure, wildlife presence,
etc. Sensors can also be deployed in the same area by
different organizations, e.g., seismic sensors can be deployed in the ocean by two different agencies. Then, sensors
belonging to each agency will constitute a group. In the
above cases, the resource consumed by groups is more
important than that consumed by individual nodes as the
distributed computation can be performed and the attributes can be measured even when some members fail. The
research in this case must investigate issues pertinent to the
sharing of resources from the perspective of groups.
A group is an intermingled set of nodes having a purpose
in common. We do not consider the motivation behind the
group formation, but investigate the sharing of resources
among different groups. The critical resource we focus on is
power. Nodes in wireless networks are powered by battery,
and size limitations compel the usage of low lifetime
batteries. This calls for judicious consumption of battery
power. Normally, communication consumes significantly
higher power than other operations. Nodes share power by
routing each others packets, and it is well-known that
multihop routing substantially decreases the overall power
consumption of the network [34]. We address the research
challenges that arise when nodes decide to route each
others packets with the sole objective of reducing the power
consumption of their groups.
Published by the IEEE CS, CASS, ComSoc, IES, & SPS
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Fig. 1. In (a) and (b), we show two different routings, where node a
constitutes Group A and node b constitutes Group B. Both groups need
to send traffic to the access point (AP). In (a), the farther node a routes
its traffic to b and b sends to AP. So, the routing in (a) reduces the power
cost of a, but increases that for b. In (b), each node routes directly to AP
and there is no reduction in power costs for both groups. In (c), nodes a1
and a2 constitute Group A and b1 constitutes Group B. Here, a1 can send
its traffic through b1 and b1 can, in turn, send through a2 . This could result
in a decrease in the total power for Groups A and B as against the case
when the groups route to AP independently.

We now enumerate some of these challenges. The nodes
in a group share power by routing each other’s packets to
common destinations. Groups are said to form coalitions1
when they route each other’s packets. The first challenge is
to determine which groups would form coalitions. Presumably, a precondition for forming coalitions among
groups is that each group communicates the same amount
of information to the chosen destinations while consuming
less power after the coalition is formed. Whether or not the
precondition is satisfied depends on the routing in the
coalition and the number of possible routes can be an
exponential function of the number of nodes in the groups.
There need not even exist a routing that reduces the power
consumption of each group. Figs. 1a and 1b show that, if
each group consists of a single node, then groups do not
mutually benefit from the coalition, but this no longer holds
if the groups consist of two or more nodes (Fig. 1c). The
challenge then is to answer whether there exists at least one
joint routing that makes the coalition mutually beneficial.
The next challenge is to compute such a joint routing. We
will show in Section 3.3 that the routing that minimizes the
total power consumption of all groups may not result in
mutually beneficial coalitions, as it may increase the power
consumption of some groups. The benefit incurred by a
group due to the coalition operation is the decrease in its
power consumption after it joins the coalition. We need to
determine a routing that shares the benefit equitably. A
simplistic approach is to insist that the groups each get the
same benefit, but this can be wasteful if one group can gain
benefit without harming the others. A max-min fair [1]
routing uses the following strategy for a pair of groups:
Determine the greatest minimum benefit to be gained by
either of the two groups when sharing and maximize the
benefit of the other group so long as the changes do not
reduce this minimum. This strategy can be generalized to
multiple groups. The challenge now is to compute a maxmin fair power aware coalition routing.
Finally, the network topology is dynamic since nodes
move and the transmission condition in the links significantly change over time. Thus, the benefits obtained
1. Even after forming a coalition, different groups maintain their separate
identities, associations with their individual organizations, and discharge
their individual responsibilities. The coalition operation just allows joint
routing.
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through coalition and, hence, the decisions to remain in
coalition change with time. When the topology changes,
even if the coalition operation remains mutually beneficial,
the max-min fair power aware coalition routing may
change. We therefore need a distributed and dynamic
algorithm that seamlessly adapts the computations in the
event of topology change.
In Section 2, we survey the relevant literature. In
Section 3, we provide a mathematical framework for a
coalition of two groups. This section presents several
distinctive properties of coalition routings. For example, a
max-min fair power aware coalition routing exhibits
important characteristics that do not hold for max-min fair
allocation of other resources such as bandwidth. We show
that the max-min fair coalition routing is guaranteed to
attain the desired minimum benefits for each group should
the coalition be feasible. In Section 4, we present a
polynomial complexity algorithm for computing the fair
coalition routing. This algorithm needs to solve a linear
program at a central processor, which requires the knowledge of the global topology. In Section 5, we present a
distributed computing scheme which allows the routing
to be computed via simple iterative computations and
message exchanges at each participating node. In Section 6,
we generalize the framework and the computation algorithms for a coalition among multiple groups in more
general networks and also consider more general models
for power consumption and signal propagation. These
coalition routing algorithms provide foundations for developing operational protocols. The design of such protocols
would require deployment of mechanisms to enforce group
routings, e.g., security checks. In Section 6, we briefly
discuss some of these issues. Refer to the Appendix for all
proofs.

2

RELATED WORK

The existing research on efficient utilization of power in
wireless networks can be classified into the following broad
categories: The first maximizes the lifetime of any given
node through optimum battery discharge strategy [6], [19].
The second varies the transmission power levels of nodes so
as to control the network topology as desired [8], [14], [23],
[25], [32]. The third reduces the power consumption by
optimizing several parameters at the MAC layer [11], [21],
[22], [31]. The last maximizes the lifetime of the network by
balancing the power consumption of different nodes [3], [4],
[17]. Another prevalent approach is to route in accordance
with a power-based metric rather than a distance metric
[34]. However, the common feature of the existing research
is that the basic entity is a node. The performance of the
network is either quantified in terms of the aggregate
performance of the nodes or that of the bottleneck node.
Hou et al. [10] propose a polynomial time algorithm to
compute lexicographic max-min (LMM) fair rate allocation
and show that this rate allocation attains the LMM node
lifetimes. The distinctive feature of our work is that the
basic entity is a group rather than a single node, and the
operations are coalitions. The performance objective we
consider is fairness and the issues significantly differ due to
the choice of the basic entity. We are concerned about the
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performance of each group rather than the network as a
whole. Relaying and caching strategies have been proposed
for node cooperation when a node decides to relay the
requests of other nodes based on its selfish interests [24],
[30]. Our research is complementary since we assume that a
group of nodes decide to route the packets of other groups
based on the interest of the group as a whole. We present an
algorithm that obtains a specific pareto optimal objective,
the max-min fair operating point.

3

MATHEMATICAL FRAMEWORK
GROUPS

FOR

COALITION

OF

3.1 Power Model
We first present the mathematical model we use for power
consumption [7], [33]. Let the transmitted energy per bit be
Et . The received energy depends on the distance between
the transmitter and the receiver and on other phenomena
like refraction (e.g., through walls), diffraction (e.g., around
buildings), reflection (e.g., on ground and objects), scattering, and absorption. The collective variation due to these
phenomena is referred to as shadowing [26]. The received
energy at a distance d is then Et 1 d , where 2    6 and
 represents the link attenuation due to shadowing. For
simplification, we assume that  does not change with time
and is the same for all links [7], [33] and we relax these
assumptions in Section 6.3. We assume that the noise level is
the same at all nodes. Let Erx be the energy per bit required
to maintain the SNR necessary for successful decoding at the
receiver. Then, for successful communication, a node must
transmit each bit at energy Etx , where Etx 1 d  Erx . The
power consumed by a transmitting node then is of the form
K1 þ K 0 rErx d , where K 0 is a constant, r is the node’s data
rate, and K1 is the node’s idle power consumption. The node
dissipates power K1 even if it does not transmit or receive
any traffic. Let constant K ¼ K 0 Erx :
The MAC and the physical layers determine K1 , K, and
. For example,  is higher for obstructed paths within
buildings. Unless otherwise stated, we will use  ¼ 4,
which corresponds to the path-loss in closed areas;
however, all analysis hold for any   0. Nodes may
exchange control packets for transmitting data packets; the
control packet exchange depends on the MAC protocol, e.g.,
IEEE 802.11 uses RTS, CTS packets. The energy consumed
in exchanging control packets determine the constant K 0 .
The linear relation between transmission power and data
rate implicitly assumes that the expected number of control
packets exchanged per data packet does not depend on the
data rate. But, for example, in IEEE 802.11, the expected
number of control packets exchanged per data packet
increases with an increase in data rates due to an increase in
collisions of RTS, CTS. Thus, strictly speaking, the dependence is not linear. But, the inaccuracy due to the linear
assumption is negligible except when the energy consumed
in transmitting the control packets is comparable to that for
transmitting data packets (Fig. 2). Since the size of each
control packet is significantly less than that of a data packet,
this happens only when the expected number of control
packets exchanged per data packet is very high, which
happens only at very high data rates. Usually, in order to

Fig. 2. We consider a network with 10 nodes such that all nodes are in
each other’s transmission range and share a single channel of capacity
11 Mbps. Node i transmits data to node ði þ 1Þ%10 at network layer
rate r. The MAC protocol is IEEE 802.11. We plot the power consumed
by node 1 as a function of r. The power includes the power consumed in
transmitting both control and data packets.

avoid excessive energy consumption in retransmitting
control packets, the system does not operate at these data
rates. Thus, most power-aware routing schemes assume this
linear dependence, e.g., [3], [4], [7], [17].

3.2 Formulation for a Single Group
We consider a network with M exit points. We denote the
set of exit points (EP) as e ¼ ðe1 ; . . . ; eM Þ.
We model the network nodes as a Weighted Directed
Graph GhV ; E; e; W i, where V is the node set for the group,
E is the edge set, e is the exit point set, and W denotes the
edge weights which are positive real numbers. Every
node v 2 V has at least one path to an exit point and the
outdegree of each exit point is 0. Hence, the exit points act
as a sink for data traffic. The node set V and the exit points
are defined through their coordinates in the euclidean
plane. The distance dðv; v0 Þ is the distance between
node v 2 V and node v0 2 V [ e. If ðv; v0 Þ 2 E; weight
wðv; v0 Þ ¼ dðv; v0 Þ4 and wðv; v0 Þ 2 W . The edge set E is
usually determined at the MAC and physical layers and
can be arbitrary except that the exit points only have
incoming edges. We now describe an example edge set.
When the node radios have limitations on maximum
transmission power for each bit, then an acceptable SNR
level can be maintained at the receiver only if the distance
from the transmitter is below a certain maximum value,
which is referred to as the transmission range ðDÞ. In such
networks, a directed edge exists from v 2 V to v0 2 V [ e if
dðv; v0 Þ < D. Origin function Oi : V ! < defines the traffic
originating at a node v 2 V for each exit point (ei ) in e. The
graph G and the origin functions are given.
Let the traffic on an edge ðv; v0 Þ intended for exit point ei
be ri ðv; v0 Þ 2 <. If ðv; v0 Þ 62 E, then rðv; v0 Þ ¼ 0. The total
outgoing
traffic from a node v for exit point ei is then
P
0
v0 2V [fei g ri ðv; v Þ, which is the load on node v, Li ðvÞ. The
sum of the incoming traffic and the originating traffic at a
node must equal the exiting traffic. Thus, 8i and 8v 2 V ,
X
X
ri ðv; v0 Þ ¼ Oi ðvÞ þ
ri ðv00 ; vÞ ¼ Li ðvÞ:
ð1Þ
v0 2V [fei g

v00 2V
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Traffic routing is an jEjM-dimensional vector ~
r whose
components satisfy (1). The components of ~
r are the traffics
on the corresponding edges. Under routing ~
r, a node v
spends power N~rðvÞ and
X X
N~rðvÞ ¼ K1 þ K
ri ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ4 ;
i

v0 2V [fei g

where the constants K1 and K are defined in Section 3.1.
Different nodes may have different energy limitations.
Thus, we assume that, for each node v, the average power
consumption is upper bounded by BðvÞ. Hence,
X X
K1 þ K
ri ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ4  BðvÞ:
i

v0 2V [fei g

The power expenditure of a group P~r is then the
total X
power consumed by all nodes in the group, i.e.,
N~rðvÞ. The group optimal power expenditure
P~r ¼
v2V
r and can
Popt is the minimum value of P~r over all possible ~
be obtained by routing the traffic over the minimum weight
path from any node v 2 V to each exit point ei 2 e for the
weights W .2 Such minimum weight paths can be computed
by well-known algorithms like Dijkstra, Bellman ford, etc.
Let v0i be the next hop node to v in such a path. If Nopt ðvÞ is
the power spent by a node v under optimal routing, then
X
Li ðvÞ  dðv; v0i Þ4 and
Nopt ðvÞ ¼ K1 þ K 
Popt ¼

X

i

Nopt ðvÞ:

ð2Þ

v2V

3.3 Coalition of Groups
We have described the terminology and the equations for a
group of nodes. Now, consider two groups of nodes, A and
B. Let their node sets be V a and V b , respectively. Let their
group optimal power expenditures before forming a
a
b
coalition be Popt
and Popt
.
Next, we consider a combined network with Groups A
and B jointly routing to the exit points. Depending on the
network scenario, each group may route to one or more exit
points. For example, when groups correspond to an
organization, they could route to their own exit point. On
the other hand, in sensor networks, each group could route
to multiple exit points. These scenarios constitute specific
cases of our model.
The vertex set V for the combined network is then
V a [ V b . The edge set E joint can be determined from V and
the MAC and physical layer considerations. For example,
E joint can be obtained using the transmission range D, i.e.,
directed edge ðv; v0 Þ 2 E joint for any v 2 V a [ V b and v0 2
V a [ V b [ e if dðv; v0 Þ < D. Also, E joint is a superset of the
edge sets of each group. Again, for any ðv; v0 Þ 2 E joint ,
weight wðv; v0 Þ ¼ dðv; v0 Þ4 . The origin functions for all the
joint
nodes remain the same. Any vector in RMjE j whose
components are nonnegative and satisfy (1) is a routing in
the joint network and will be referred to as a coalition
routing. Note that rðv; v0 Þ ¼ 0 if ðv; v0 Þ 62 E joint . For an
2. Here, the weight of a path is the sum of the weights of the links in the
path.

Fig. 3. Groups A ða1 ; a2 Þ and B ðb1 ; b2 Þ route to the exit point EP. Each
node sends 1 Mbps.

arbitrary coalition routing ~
r, we now evaluate the power
expenditure for each node. Let J~ra and J~rb be the total power
expenditure for nodes in Groups A and B, respectively,
under routing ~
r.
X
X
N~rðvÞ and J~rb ¼
N~rðvÞ:
Then; J~ra ¼
v2V a

v2V b

Definition 1. Group benefit under coalition routing ~
r is the
difference between the power spent by the group under
individual optimal routing before merging and the power
spent by the group for coalition routing ~
r. The group benefits
~~r  ðBa ; Bb Þ; Ba ¼
~~r, where B
form the benefit vector B
~
r
~
r
~
r
a
a
b
b
b
Popt  J~r and B~r ¼ Popt  J~r.
The idea behind combining two groups is to reduce the
total power each group was spending initially. Depending
on the system, group coalition may introduce some
additional operational cost and groups would want to
benefit over and above this cost. Let t be the benefit below
which groups will not be willing to enter into a coalition.
The value of t would depend on group policies and the
overhead for the coalition.
Definition 2. A coalition is useful with a routing ~
r if
minðB~ar ; B~br Þ  t.
Defition 3. A coalition is useful if it is useful with some
routing ~
r.
We will present an algorithm to compute such a routing ~
r if
one exists.
Definition 4. A minimal coalition routing is a coalition
routing that results in the optimal or the minimal total power
expenditure for Groups A and B combined.
Next, we illustrate the combination of two groups with
an example. Consider Fig. 3, in which Groups A and B
route to a single exit point. Each node generates traffic at
the rate of 1 Mbps. Let K ¼ 1,
pﬃﬃK
ﬃ4 1 ¼ 0. Optimal power
4
þ
2
¼ 20 and, for Group B,
expenditure
for
Group
A
is
2
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ4
is 14 þ 4:25  19. For the minimal power coalition
routpﬃﬃﬃ
ing shown, power expenditure for A is 14 þ 2ð 2Þ4 ¼ 9 and
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Fig. 5. Fair coalition routing when each node sends 1 Mbps. The
numbers next to the links are the rates.

Fig. 4. “Benefit vectors” under “minimal coalition.”

pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ4
for B is 2ð1Þ4 þ 1:25  3:6. The benefit for Group A is
20  9 ¼ 11 and for B is 19  3:6 ¼ 15:4 and both the
components are positive. Consider now that node b2 has a
higher load to send, e.g., 5 Mbps. This will be relayed
through a2 in the coalition routing of Fig. 3. Node a2 will
have a high power consumption (24) and the benefit of
Group A will be negative (5). This demonstrates that the
minimal coalition routing may not benefit each group.
Definition 5. A feasible benefit vector is one that results from
a coalition routing ~
r. The set of all feasible benefit vectors is the
feasible benefit region.

3.4 Properties of the Feasible Benefit Region
Theorem 1. The set of feasible benefit vectors is convex and
closed.
We now demonstrate that different feasible benefit vectors
can lead to disparate benefits for the groups.
For the minimal coalition routing, we can find the power
expenditure for each node, i.e., Nopt ðvÞ for each v 2 V a [ V b .
a
b
and Jopt
be the powers spent by nodes of
Further, let Jopt
Groups A and B, respectively, under the minimal coalition
routing.
X
X
a
b
¼
Nopt ðvÞ and Jopt
¼
Nopt ðvÞ:
Jopt
v2V a

v2V b

Note again that the subscript “opt” to J refers to the
minimal coalition routing for nodes of Groups A and B
~ corresponding to the
combined. The benefit vector L
minimal coalition routing is then ðLaopt ; Lbopt Þ, where Laopt ¼
a
a
b
b
 Jopt
and Lbopt ¼ Popt
 Jopt
. Let K ¼ 1 and let there be a
Popt
~ is plotted in Fig. 4 for
single exit point. The vector L
different random placements of nodes. Each group has
20 nodes uniformly distributed over a square of side 100m
and the network is fully connected, i.e., each node can
directly transmit to every other node. If the benefit vector is
in the first quadrant (both coordinates are positive), then the
groups mutually benefit from being merged; otherwise, one
of the groups is a loser. Most pairs of groups benefit from a
minimal coalition, but there are many instances in which
only one group benefits. Even when a pair of groups
mutually benefits, there is often some disproportion in the
extent of benefit, with one group getting somewhat more
than the other. This motivates the fair allocation of benefits.

3.5 Max-Min Fair Benefit Vector
Definition 6. A feasible benefit vector B~r is max-min fair if, for
all i, B~ir cannot be increased while maintaining feasibility
without decreasing B~jr for some group j, for which B~jr  B~ir .
Corollary 1. The max-min fair benefit vector exists and is
unique.
The corollary follows as a consequence of Theorem 1 and
results from [28].
Definition 7. A fair coalition routing is a coalition routing that
results in a max-min fair benefit vector.
Minimum component property. If ~
r is a fair coalition
routing, then minðB~ar ; B~br Þ  minðBar~1 ; Bbr~1 Þ for any other
coalition routing r~1 . This property follows from the
definition of the max-min fair benefit vector.
In Fig. 3, the max-min fair benefit vector when K ¼ 1 and
M ¼ 1 is (11.9,11.9). This is achieved when node b2 sends
0.78 Mbps to a2 and 0.22 Mbps directly to EP like in Fig. 5.
Proposition 1. Let ~
r be a fair coalition routing. Then,
a
b
minðB~r; B~rÞ  0.
Thus, a coalition does not increase the power consumption
of any group if fair coalition routing is used.
Theorem 2. A coalition will be useful if and only if it is useful
with a fair coalition routing ~
r.
Theorem 2 presents a necessary and a sufficient condition for deciding whether the coalition would be useful.
Theorem 3. For two groups, the max-min fair benefit vector has
equal components.
Theorem 3 will be used in developing an efficient
algorithm for computing a fair coalition routing for two
groups.
Note that, for other resource allocation problems, e.g.,
bandwidth allocation, the max-min fair vector need not
have equal components even for two contenders (Fig. 6) [5].

Fig. 6. Consider two sessions (a,c) and (b,d). The numbers next to the
links are the link bandwidths. The max-min fair bandwidth for session
(a,c) and (b,d) are 3 and 1, respectively.
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4

FAIR COALITION ALGORITHM (FC)

4.1 Description
We show that the fair coalition routing and the associated
benefit vector can be computed by solving the following
linear program:
FC: Maximize Z:
Subject to:
Z  B~ar  0;
K1 þ K

X
i

Z  B~br  0;

X

ri ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ4  BðvÞ 8 v 2 V a [ V b ;

v0 2V a [V b [fe

ig

ð3Þ
X

ri ðv; v0 Þ 

v0 2V a [V b [fei g

X
ri ðv00 ; vÞ ¼ Oi ðvÞ8 v; v0 2 V a [ V b and i:

v00 2V a [V b

ð4Þ
The power consumption of each node is constrained in
(3) and the flows are balanced in (4). Let Z  be the objective
function value obtained from FC.
Theorem 4. The routing ~
r obtained as a solution of FC is a fair
coalition routing.
Proof: Let minbenð~
rÞ ¼ minðB~ar ; B~br Þ. From Theorem 3 and
the minimum component property, any feasible routing
that attains the maximum value of minbenð~
rÞ is a fair
coalition routing ~
r. Thus, FC computes the fair coalition
routing.
u
t
The exit point can solve FC to compute the fair
coalition routing and the max-min fair benefit. The linear
program involves ðM þ 1ÞjV a [ V b j þ 2 constraints and
MjE joint j þ 1 variables. Hence, the max-min fair benefit
vector and the fair coalition routing are polynomial
complexity computable [13].
For solving FC, an exit point needs to know the edge
set E joint and the distances between the nodes. Initially,
the nodes inform the exit point, their incident edges, and
the distances from their neighbors, and later they inform
the exit point only when these change. The MAC and the
physical layers of a node v determine its incident
edges ðv; v0 Þ and ðv0 ; vÞ in E joint . Nodes can learn the
distances from their neighbors by power measurements
and positioning algorithms, some of which do not need
GPS [2].

4.2 Simulation Results
We investigate the efficacy of fair coalition routing through
simulations using MATLAB. We evaluate the benefits
attained by different coalition routing schemes. We also
consider other performance attributes, such as network
lifetime, end-to-end path lengths, additional power consumption for providing fairness, etc. We consider a network
with one exit point ðM ¼ 1Þ and a coalition of two groups.
Nodes of both groups are distributed in a square of side
100m. Each node generates traffic at the rate of 1 Mbps. The
value of K depends on the choice of the wireless interface,
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and its effect is to scale our measurements. Thus, without
loss of generality, we consider K ¼ 1. We will later mention
details for a specific interface. Note that the benefit values
do not depend on K1 . We consider a different number of
nodes, different distributions of nodes, different locations of
the exit point, different sizes of the groups, different
distances between groups, and report averages over
100 random topologies in each case.
We first consider a fully connected network, i.e., each
node can transmit directly to every other node. We assume
that both groups have an equal number of nodes, the exit
point is at the center of the square, and all nodes are
uniformly distributed in the square. In Fig. 7a, we plot the
benefit values as a function of the number of nodes. As
proved before, the max-min fair benefit vector will have
equal components. We plot the average values of the
maximum component of the benefit vector of the minimal
coalition routing (max-opt), the minimum component of the
benefit vector of the minimal coalition routing (min-opt),
and the max-min fair benefit (max-min). As expected, the
max-min group benefit is between the maximum and the
minimum components of the benefit vector of the minimal
coalition routing. Benefits initially increase and later
decrease with an increase in the number of nodes. This
can be explained as follows: Power consumption in a
routing scheme decreases if the distance between consecutive nodes in a path decreases. This holds even if such a
decrease increases the number of hops. This is because the
power consumed in any routing is proportional to 1) the
expectation of the fourth power of the distance in each hop
and 2) the number of hops. When the number of nodes is
small, each group has a small number of nodes and, thus,
joint routings allow packet transmissions across hops that
are significantly shorter than those in the individually
optimal routings in each group. Thus, joint routings have
substantially lower power consumption. This effect becomes more pronounced with an increase in the number of
nodes for a moderate number of nodes. But, when the
number of nodes becomes really large, each group has a
large number of nodes and the hop distances and, hence,
the power consumptions in the individual optimal routings
become small as well.3 Thus, the benefits of joint routing
decrease. Nevertheless, the benefit values are still considerable even for networks with 200 nodes.
In Fig. 7b, we consider a different path loss exponent,
 ¼ 2, which arises in open environments. Here, the trends
are similar to Fig. 7a, but the benefits are somewhat smaller.
This is because the reduction in power consumption due to
the reduction in hop-distances dðv; v0 Þ obtained by the joint
routings are less for  ¼ 2 than for  ¼ 4, as the power
consumed in a link ðv; v0 Þ is proportional to dðv; v0 Þ .
We now revert to the closed environment,  ¼ 4, and
compare the lifetime of the network attained under
different coalition routing schemes. The network lifetime
3. Recently, Zhao et al. [35] proved that when nodes are uniformly
distributed and their number n becomes large, the network transfers
ðn=lognÞ amount of data before any node dies. In other words, the data
transferred by a network in its lifetime becomes arbitrarily large with an
increase in n. This happens because of a reduction in the distance between
consecutive nodes in the routes. Although Zhao et al. do not consider
networks with groups, their result is consistent with our observation.
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Fig. 7. Performance of coalition routings in networks consisting of two groups of equal sizes and nodes uniformly distributed in a square of size 100m.
(a) Benefits in closed environments. (b) Benefits in open environments. (c) Maximum node power. (d) Network lifetime. (e) Fairness overhead.
(f) Hop delay performance.

can be defined in different ways, e.g., it can be considered
as the time required for a certain fraction of nodes to die, the
first time instant at which the network is disconnected, etc.
[3], [4], [34]. The lifetime of a network for all these metrics is
governed by the power consumption of the nodes that
spend high power and die faster than others. Thus, in
 where X
 is the
 þ x Þ=X,
Fig. 7c, we plot the quantity ðX
mean power over all nodes and x is the standard
deviation. Note that this quantity is a measure of the
statistical maximum of the power spent by any node. Fair
coalition routing has a lower value of this quantity as
compared to the minimal. This happens because the
minimal coalition routing derives its advantages by routing
a significant amount of traffic through a few nodes. We
therefore expect that fair coalition routing will have a higher
lifetime under most metrics (i.e., all metrics that depend on
the power consumption of the nodes that consume more
power than others). To demonstrate that this is indeed the
case, we choose a particular notion of lifetime; namely, the
time required for a certain fraction (e.g., 5 percent) of nodes
to die. We assume that all nodes have the same initial
energy. In Fig. 7d, we plot the ratio between the lifetimes of
the network under the fair and the minimal coalition
routings that are computed when all nodes are functional.
We also plot the ratio of the lifetimes of the group with the
minimum lifetime under fair coalition and the group with
the minimum lifetime under minimal coalition routings.
Consistent with our expectation, the ratio is always above 1.
Fig. 7e plots the total powers spent under the minimal and
fair coalition routings and their difference. This difference
can be looked upon as the cost for providing fairness. Here,

K1 ¼ 0. The average cost is modest (18 percent) considering
the benefit (46 percent)4 obtained and the fairness achieved.
In Fig. 7f, we plot the average number of hops traversed
by each packet before it reaches the exit point. We notice
that, on an average, the fair and minimal coalition routings
use a similar number of hops. The hop count affects the
average end-to-end delay experienced by packets. But, the
delay also depends on other factors such as interference.
The detailed investigation of the delay and interference
issues in coalition routing is beyond the scope of this paper.
We now evaluate the benefits for different distributions
of nodes, different locations of the exit point, different sizes
of the groups, and different distances between groups. But,
the trends and the conclusions remain the same as in the
previous cases.
Fig. 8a shows the results for unequal group sizes. One
group is four times as large as the other. The nodes are still
uniformly distributed. The smaller group has a lesser benefit
under the minimal coalition routing in this case. The
remaining trends are the same as for groups with equal sizes.
We now investigate the effect of clustered topologies on
the benefit values (Figs. 8b and 8c). Both groups have an
equal number of nodes. In Fig. 8b, nodes of each group are
normally distributed with a variance of 25 around the
respective group centroids that are uniformly distributed.
The group with the centroid closer to the exit point has
negative benefit under the minimal coalition routing and
zero benefit under the fair coalition routing. The group
closer to the exit point loses after coalition when the
4. The cost percent is obtained from Fig. 7e. The benefit percent is with
respect to the total power consumed prior to the coalition and is obtained
from Fig. 7a and Fig. 7e.
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Fig. 8. Benefit values for coalition routings for different network scenarios. (a) Skewed Group sizes. (b) Effect of clustered groups. (c) Clustered
topology. (d) Exit point at end. (e) Intergroup distance. (f) Lower transmission range D.

minimal coalition routing is used, but not when the fair
coalition routing is used. Here, the benefits of the fair
coalition routing starts decreasing for a much larger
number of nodes than in the uniform distribution case
(Fig. 7a), as the topology becomes pervasive only for a much
larger number of nodes. For example, when the number of
nodes in the network is 400, the benefit reduces by
25 percent as compared to the benefit in a network with
200 nodes. In Fig. 8c, we consider a network with two
clusters of equal sizes, but now the clusters include an equal
number of nodes from both groups. The nodes in each
cluster are normally distributed with a variance of 25
around the respective group centroids that are uniformly
distributed. Here, both groups obtain positive benefits
under fair coalition.
We now investigate the case when the exit point is at the
edge of the square. We consider two different distributions
of nodes: 1) uniform (Fig. 8d) and 2) normal (Fig. 8e). For
uniform distribution, the trends are similar to the case with
the exit point at the center (Fig. 7a). But, since all nodes are
now in the same side of the exit point, the paths to the exit
point contain a larger number of nodes of both groups and,
hence, the benefits are higher. For normal distribution, the
nodes of each group are normally distributed around the
centroid of the group with a variance of 25. The centroids
are equidistant from the exit point and at a distance d from
each other, where d is a measure of the separation between
the groups. In Fig. 8e, we plot the benefits as a function of d.
The benefits decrease as d increases as then fewer nodes
from one group can route the packets of the other group
due to the larger separation between the groups.
We now relax the assumption that the network is fully
connected and assume that each node can transmit directly

to only nodes within distance D. We investigate the effect of
different transmission ranges D on the benefits in Fig. 8f.
The network has 20 nodes in each group, but the
characteristics are otherwise similar to that considered in
Fig. 7a. Lower values of D will result in fewer edges in the
network. The benefit increases significantly with an increase
in D for lower values of D as more and more nodes can be
included in potential routes to the exit point. Note that the
maximum possible
pﬃﬃﬃ distance between any two nodes in this
network isp100
2. A slight drop can be noticed when D is
ﬃﬃﬃ
around 10 2. This is because the power consumption of the
group optimal decreases by a smaller amount
that of
pﬃﬃthan
ﬃ
the fair coalition routing. When D exceeds 18 2, the curves
level off. The transmission range is now high enough to
include those nodes which would have been a part of the
coalition routing in the fully connected case.
For the Lucent 802.11b Orinoco card, a rate of 1 Mbps in
closed environment corresponds to 15dBm of output power
[18]. The constant K is then roughly 5:5  106 W =Mbit  m4 .
For any value of K1 , this translates to a benefit of 30 Watts
for a group with 10 nodes for the uniform case with equal
group sizes. It is also worthwhile to note that the CPU time
to compute FC, for any of the above topologies, was not
more than 0.5 seconds on a 700Mhz/256MB RAM laptop
using a simplex algorithm implementation [9].

5

DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION

The algorithm in Section 4.1 for computing the fair coalition
routing requires a centralized computation at the exit point.
Though the simplest solution, it will not be computationally
tractable when the exit points have capability similar to the
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nodes themselves. Consider, for example, a sensor network
where a group of sensors communicate their measurements
to a common node which, in turn, transmits to, say, a
satellite. Here, we would not want to overwhelm the relay
node with the linear programming computation. Furthermore, when nodes move, the edge set E changes. For
example, when a node can directly transmit to only nodes
within its transmission range D, then links between two
nodes will be created (cease to exist) when one moves in to
(out of) the transmission range of another. Finally, the
power consumed for transmission of each bit in a link will
change with a change in the distance between the incident
nodes. The traffic generation rate of each node will also
change with time. Due to these changes, the coalition may
no longer be useful or may start being useful or the fair
coalition routing may change. Thus, FC must be solved
every time such changes occur. Rather than having the exit
point repeat the entire computation in every such instance,
it is beneficial to have a distributed implementation where
every node performs some simple iterative computations
and the values seamlessly converge to the max-min fair
solution. Based on the new max-min fair solution, the
groups can determine whether the coalition is useful
(Theorem 3) and use the fair coalition routing if they
remain in or join the coalition.
Now, we present an iterative approach to compute a fair
coalition routing for two groups. This has been motivated
by recently proposed solutions for optimization problems in
other resource allocation settings [12], [29]. Let Zn and ~
rn
denote the corresponding quantities in iteration n, where Z0
and r~0 can be arbitrarily chosen. The initial choices need not
satisfy any of the constraints. Thus, each node can select the
initial values of the loads for each of its outgoing edges
without any coordination with the other nodes. Similarly,
Z0 is selected at an exit point. Now, we define some
indicators. The benefit indicator of a group is 1 if Zn is more
than the group benefit.
(
a
;
0; if Zn þ Jra~n  Popt
a
n ¼
a
a
1; if Zn þ Jr~n > Popt :
(
bn

¼

0; if

b
Zn þ Jrb~n  Popt
;

1; if

b
Zn þ Jrb~n > Popt
:

We now outline the rate update mechanism for the traffic
intended for each of the M exit points. Node congestion cvn;i
is the difference between the outgoing and the sum of the
originating and incoming traffic at node v for exit point i.
From (4),
!
X
X
v
0
00
cn;i ¼
rn;i ðv; v Þ  Oi ðvÞ þ
rn;i ðv ; vÞ :
v0 2V a [V b [fei g

v00 2V a [V b

The node congestion indicator for node v for traffic directed
to exit point i is
8
0 if cvn;i ¼ 0;
>
<
1 if cvn;i > 0;
svn;i ¼
>
:
1 if cvn;i < 0:
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Traffic for exit point i at node v is considered balanced,
lightly loaded, or heavily loaded as svn;i is 0; 1 and 1,
respectively. For the exit point, sen ¼ 0. The power level
indicator at node v, tvn is set to 1 if the current power
consumption exceeds the limit BðvÞ and 0 otherwise. Hence,
tvn ¼
8
< 0 if

K1 þ K

P P

0

Þdðv; v0 Þ4  BðvÞ;

: 1 if

K1 þ K

P P

0

Þdðv; v0 Þ4 > BðvÞ:

i
i

v0 2V a [V b [fei g ri ðv; v
v0 2V a [V b [fei g ri ðv; v

We present an iterative approach using the above indicators. Note that svn;i and tvn can be updated at node v using the
incoming rates in the previous iteration. Now, the updates
of an and bn require a knowledge of the total power being
spent by the nodes of a group. We will discuss how to
acquire this information in a distributed manner.
Let fn g be the step-sizes that satisfy limn!1 n ¼ 0 and
P1
n¼1 n ¼ 1. For example, n ¼ 1=n satisfies the conditions. Each node v updates its outgoing traffic in edges
ðv; v0 Þ 2 E joint as follows. ½ þ denotes the projection on
½0; 1Þ.
rnþ1;i ðv; v0 Þ ¼
h

i
0
if v 2 V a :
rn;i ðv; v0 Þ  n svn;i  svn;i þ þdðv; v0 Þ4 ðtvn þ an Þ
þ

rnþ1;i ðv; v0 Þ ¼
h

i
0
if v 2 V b :
rn;i ðv; v0 Þ  n svn;i  svn;i þ þdðv; v0 Þ4 ðtvn þ bn Þ
þ

0

0

joint

Trivially, rnþ1;i ðv; v Þ ¼ 0 if ðv; v Þ ¼ E .
The exit point updates Z as follows:
Znþ1 ¼ ½Zn þ n ð1  ðan þ bn ÞÞ þ :
Theorem 5. For all  > 1, the iterative procedure stated above
will converge to the max-min fair benefit vector and fair
coalition routing, irrespective of the initial choice of the
iterates.
Since the convergence guarantees in Theorem 5 hold
irrespective of the initial choice of the iterates, the
procedure converges to the fair allocations even after
changes in E joint and the power consumed in the links.
Now, we outline a distributed scheme to implement the
iterations. Assume that we have a spanning tree connecting
nodes of each group to any one of the exit points. Refer to
Fig. 9a. Each leaf node L sends a power packet (PP)
upstream that contains the power expended by L. Each
node of a group adds all the power values in the PP arriving
from its downstream branches, adds its own power
expenditure to the sum, and sends a PP upstream with
the resulting power value. Using these group powers, the
exit point determines anþ1 and bnþ1 and updates Zn . The exit
point communicates an and bn to each group through
congestion indicator packet CP and the nodes can use these
to update their rates. The PP and CP can be separate packets
or they can be piggybacked on the data and acknowledgement packets.
We now evaluate the convergence time of the distributed
implementation. We consider a fully connected network
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Fig. 9. Distributed implementation. (a) Exchange of PP and CP. Circles and pentagons denote the two groups. Let the power spent by nodes a, b,
and c be 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The PPs sent by a, b, and c have power values 1, 2, and 6, respectively. (b) Convergence for the distributed
0. During iteration 2,000, nodes change their positions. After iteration 2,400,
computation. Here,  ¼ 2;500 and n ¼ 1=n; 8 n, Z0 ¼ 107 , and r~0 ¼ ~
nodes change their positions one by one (by 10 percent) till iteration 6,000. After iteration 6,100, the transmission rates change (by 5 percent).

with 10 nodes in each group, where the nodes are uniformly
distributed in a square of side 100m and one exit point is at
the center. Each node generates traffic at the rate of 1 Mbps.
We assume that the size of each CP and PP packet is
15 bytes. The CP and the PP packets traverse a total of
12 hops per iteration. Now, if the transmission rate in each
link is 11 Mbps, then each iteration consumes approximately 0.13 milliseconds. Here, K ¼ 1,  ¼ 2;500, and
0. The benefit Zn converges
n ¼ 1=n, 8n, Z0 ¼ 107 , and r~0 ¼ ~
to the max-min fair benefit value of 5:5  106 in 1,000 iterations which consume 130 milliseconds (Fig. 9b). In general,
the initial convergence time will depend on how far the
initial guess is from the optimal.
We next demonstrate that the recomputations that result
from incremental changes in topology and traffic generation
rates converge much faster. We assume that, during
iteration number 2,000 (i.e., after the initial convergence),
all nodes select new locations—the new locations are also
uniformly distributed. The power consumptions in the links
now change due to the topology rearrangement, but Zn
converges to the new max-min fair value in 400 iterations,
which consumed 50 milliseconds. The convergence is faster
as compared to the initial convergence because only the
node positions were changed, while their traffic generation
rates remained the same. Thereafter, between iterations
2,400 and 6,000, nodes change their positions one by one. If a
node i’s current x-coordinate (y-coordinate) is xi , then it
selects its new x-coordinate (y-coordinate) uniformly within
½0:9xi ; 1:1xi ð½0:9yi ; 1:1zi Þ. On an average, 60 iterations
( 8 ms) are required for convergence for each change.
Finally, between iteration 6,100 and 8,100, the nodes change
their traffic generation rates one by one. If a node i’s current
generation rate is OðiÞ, then its new rate is uniformly
distributed within ½0:95OðiÞ; 1:05OðiÞ . Now, on average
after each change, Zn converges to the new max-min fair
value in 20 iterations ( 3 ms).
Groups join or remain in the coalition if and only if the
new max-min fair benefit Zn exceeds the minimum required
benefit t (Theorem 3), and they use the corresponding fair
coalition routing whenever they are in a coalition. To
prevent routing instability and oscillations, the groups
evaluate the coalition formation decision and alter the
routing only when 1) the current value of Zn substantially

differs from that at the previous decision epoch and 2) Zn
remains at its current value for some time which ensures
convergence. Determination of these necessary deviations
and time durations and also the security mechanisms
required to enforce the coalition formation decisions and
the fair coaliton routing constitute separate research topics
and are beyond the scope of the current work. However, we
briefly discuss some of the security issues in Section 6.4.

6

DISCUSSION

AND

GENERALIZATIONS

We now describe how the framework we have proposed
and the analytical results we have obtained can be
generalized to include several additional features of
practical relevance.

6.1 Multigroup Fair Coalition Algorithm
We now investigate the max-min fair benefit vector and
fair coalition routing when multiple ðnÞ groups attempt to
form a coalition. Definition 6 also defines the max-min fair
benefit vector in this case. This case is significantly
different from the two group case discussed earlier. Let
i
be the minimum possible power spent by Group i to
Popt
route to the exit points before joining the coalition. Also, let
J~ri be the power spent by nodes of Group i under coalition
routing ~
r. The benefit for Group i is then B~ir 8I ¼ 1 . . . n
i
i
 J~ri . The benefit vector for the coalition
with B~r ¼ Popt
~
routing is B~r  ðB~1r ; B~2r . . . B~nr Þ.
We mention some important properties of fair coalition
routing for multiple group coalition.
Proposition 2. Consider three groups, A, B, and C. Consider
three separate coalitions (A, B), (B, C), and (A, B, C). If the
pairwise coalitions (A, B) and (B, C) are mutually beneficial
for each group (i.e., the benefit for each group under some
coalition routing is positive), then the coalition (A, B, C) is
beneficial for each group.
A counterexample presented in Fig. 10 shows that the
converse is not true.
The components of the max-min fair benefit vector need
not be equal when more than two groups combine. Refer to
Fig. 11, where each node generates 1 Mbps. Here, M ¼ 1
and K ¼ 1.
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Fig. 10. All three groups, A, B, and C, will benefit if routing together but
no two taken at a time will be mutually beneficial.

Now, we present the multigroup FC algorithm. This
algorithm solves a sequence of linear programs. Note that
solving a single linear program is not sufficient since the
components of the max-min fair benefit allocation need not
be equal in this general case.
Let I ¼ f1 . . . ng, INC refer to the individual node
constraints (3), and LF refer to the load flow condition (4)
generalized to multiple groups.
Stage1 : Maximize: Z:
Subject to: Z  B~ir 8i 2 I
~
r satisfies INC and LF.

Let Z be the objective value and r~ be the routing obtained
1

1

from above. Let equal ¼ ft : Btr~ ¼ Z1 g.
1

Substage1 For each k 2 equal,
Maximize: B~kr :
Subject to: B~ir  Z1 8i 2 I n fkg
~
r satisfies INC and LF.
Let r~k be the routing corresponding to the kth maximization
8k 2 equal. Let e1 ¼ fn : Bnr~n ¼ Z1 g.
Stage2 : Maximize: Z:
Subject to: Z  B~ir 8i 2 I n e1
B~ir  Z1 8i 2 e1
~
r satisfies INC and LF.

Let Z be the objective value and r~ be the routing obtained
2

Fig. 12. We average the minimum, second minimum, and the largest
component over 100 topologies.

B~ir  Zt 8i 2 et 8t ¼ 1 . . . ði  1Þ
~
r satisfies INC and LF.
Theorem 6. The routing ~
r obtained as a solution of multigroup
FC is a fair coalition routing.
Fig. 12 shows benefits for fair coalition routing for three
equal sized groups spread over a square of side 100m. Here,
M ¼ 1 and K ¼ 1.

6.2 Receiving Power
We have so far assumed that a node does not consume
any power when it is receiving information. We now relax
this assumption and assume that the receiving power of a
node is proportional to the incoming traffic rate. The total
power expenditure of a node v is the sum of the power
P
spent to transmit load
i Li ðvÞ and to receive load
P
ðL
ðvÞ

O
ðvÞÞ.
Thus,
i
i
i
X X
N~rðvÞ ¼ K1 þ K
ri ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ4

from above. Let equal ¼ ft : Btr~ ¼ Z2 g.

i

2

Substage2 For each k 2 equal
Maximize: B~kr :
Subject to: B~ir  Z2 8i 2 I n e1 n fkg
B~ir  Z1 8i 2 e1
~
r satisfies INC and LF.
Let r~j be the routing corresponding to the jth maximization
8j 2 equal. Let e2 ¼ fn : Bnr~n ¼ Z2 g. Similarly in the ith step.
Stagei : Maximize: Z:
Subject to: Z  B~ir 8i 2 I n e1 n e2 . . . n ei1

Fig. 11. D is the transmission range. The max-min fair benefit for the star
and the circle group is 14D4 =16, while that for the pentagon group is
zero.

i

v0 2V [fei g

X

X

i

v0 2V [fei g

X
þ K0
ðLi ðvÞ  Oi ðvÞÞ

2

¼ K1 þ K
þ K0
J~ra ¼

X

XX
i

ri ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ4

ri ðv00 ; vÞðfrom ð1ÞÞ:

v00 2V

N~rðvÞ:

v2V a

Similarly;

J~rb

¼

X

N~rðvÞ:

v2V b

The max-min fair benefit vector and the fair coalition
routing can be computed by substituting the expressions for
J~ra , J~rb in FC with the above.5
The distributed algorithm remains similar except for the
rate update strategy which needs to be modified. We
describe the update strategy for rnþ1 ðv; v0 Þ when v 2 V a and
ðv; v0 Þ 2 E joint : The update strategy for rnþ1;i ðv; v0 Þ when v 2
V b and ðv; v0 Þ 2 E joint can be obtained by interchanging a
with b in the following:
a
b
5. Now, Popt
(Popt
) can still be obtained by routing the traffic using the
minimum weight path in Group a ðbÞ, but the weight of a link ðv; v0 Þ is now
0 4
0
Kdðv; v Þ þ K instead of dðv; v0 Þ4 . This happens since we assume that the
receiving power depends only on the received rate.
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rnþ1;i ðv; v0 Þ ¼
h
i
0
rn;i ðv; v0 Þ  n ðsvn;i  svn;i þ dðv; v0 Þ4 an Þ if v 2 V a ; v0 2 e:
þ

0

rnþ1;i ðv; v Þ ¼
h


 i
0
rn;i ðv; v0 Þ  n svn;i  svn;i þ K 0 =K þ dðv; v0 Þ4 an

þ

if v; v0 2 V a :
rnþ1;i ðv; v0 Þ ¼
h
i
0
rn;i ðv; v0 Þ  n ðsvn;i  svn;i þ dðv; v0 Þ4 an þ bn Þ

þ

Fig. 13. IPSec Costs.

if v 2 V a ; v 2 V b :
The convergence guarantees in Theorem 5 hold.

6.3 Generalized Propagation Model
We first consider a simple generalization where ðv; v0 Þs are
different for different links, but do not change with time.
This happens when the environment is static. Now, for
successful communication to v0 , a node v must transmit each
bit at energy Etx , where Etx ðv; v0 Þ1 dðv; v0 Þ  Erx : The
power consumed by node v under routing ~
r is then
P
K1 þ K v0 2V [feg rðv; v0 Þðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ . Thus, dðv; v0 Þ must
now be replaced with ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ everywhere (note that
ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ can be obtained by measuring the signal
strength at receiver v0 ). The framework remains the same
other than this change, and all analytical guarantees hold.
We next consider the case that the environment and,
hence, ðv; v0 Þ changes with time for each link ðv; v0 Þ.6 The
time duration during which ðv; v0 Þ does not change for a
link ðv; v0 Þ is referred to as the coherence time of the link.
Coherence times are large when nodes move around
slowly, e.g., when the maximum node velocity vmax is
lower than 5 m/s, the coherence time is c=ðvmax  fÞ ¼
ð3  108 Þ=ð5  2:4  109 Þ ¼ 25 ms [26, p. 165]. Here, f is the
center frequency of the signal and c is the speed of light.
The fair coalition routing can now be recomputed every
time ðv; v0 Þ changes. Since the distributed algorithm
converges fast in the presence of incremental changes,
the rate allocation can seamlessly adapt to changes in
ðv; v0 Þ. However, if ðv; v0 Þ changes rapidly, statistical
information must be used to determine the link rates and
the transmission powers. Specifically, the transmission
powers and the routing
be determined assuming that
pcan
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v0 Þ , as with a high probðv; v0 Þ ¼ E ½ðv; v0 Þ þ 2 Var½ðv;
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
0
0
ability, ðv; v Þ  E ½ðv; v Þ þ 2 Var½ðv; v0 Þ .
6.4 Trust Issues
We assume that members of a group trust one another and
are willing to jointly route packets to save power in the
interest of the group as a whole. We assume that when
groups agree to form a coalition, they trust one another to
use the fair coalition routing. There is related work [20] on
how to detect cheating in which one or more parties do not
support their agreed routing rules. Nodes in a group can
use security schemes to ensure that they route for other
6. When the environment is not static, ðv; v0 Þ is modeled as a random
variable whose logarithm is normally distributed with mean zero and a
variance of 5-12dB depending on the environment [26].

nodes in the same group and in groups that are participating in the coalition. Within a group, one can identify trusted
members with public key certificates and thereafter establish a symmetric key for authenticating individual packets.
Different groups can be authenticated via third party public
key repository. This can prevent nodes from masquerading
as nodes of some other group that is already a part of an
active coalition. This leads to a natural question as to what
is the cost incurred to enforce group routing.
We tested whether this incurs significant additional
power if it is done with IPSec tunnels [16] between
neighboring nodes. To get an idea of the processing
overhead, we let a Dell L400 laptop running Windows
2000 generate constant bit rate UDP traffic over an 802.11b
network. The payload rate was fixed at 4 Mbps. For various
security parameters, we measured the time for the laptop to
die down.7 Fig. 13 shows the results for three cases
averaged over five runs of the experiment. The first column
shows that the laptop battery died in 95 minutes after
sending 2861MB of data in plaintext. Header overhead
accounts for the rate of 4.016 Mbps to send 4 Mbps of
payload. Authentication used null-encrypted ESP [15] with
SHA1 for message authentication codes; encryption used
ESP with SHA1 and 3DES. Encryption has a significant
effect on power, but it is not really needed to enforce group
routing. We can assume that nodes encrypt end-to-end and
do not need hop-by-hop encryption. Hence, it is possible to
enforce group routing efficiently with only modest power
costs by using authentication with null encryption. Thus, it
is clearly worthwhile to use group routing.
IPSec is a sufficiently efficient enforcement mechanism
when the number of nodes is less than 50. This is because
each node is likely to route to only a few others. Thus, about
50–100 tunnels are required and these can all use null
encryption. There are techniques that work efficiently for
larger groups (see, for example, the IETF documents from
the Multicast Security working group, msec) but these seem
unnecessary if the nodes are laptops. For sensor networks, a
more specialized security protocol may be necessary. A
comprehensive design of security mechanisms is beyond
the focus of this paper.
7. Before each experiment, the laptop was charged fully from a
completely dead battery to nullify battery memory and hysteresis and
was subsequently switched off for 2 hours to eliminate heating-related
discrepancies.
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CONCLUSIONS

We have studied the problem of forming coalitions between
groups of nodes with the intent of saving power. We found
that an application of max-min fair techniques to this
problem yields an efficient and balanced approach which
we call fair coalition routing. We developed a theory and
algorithms for fair coalition routing. We have carried out a
range of simulations that demonstrate that fair coalition
routing is practical and beneficial in common cases.

APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider two possible coalition
routings between A and B. Let Pr~a1 and Pr~b1 be the
powers expended for routing r~1 by Groups A and B,
respectively, and Pr~a2 and Pr~b2 similarly for routing r~2 . The
a
b
 Pr~a1 ; Popt
 Pr~b1 Þ
benefits vector for routing r~1 is ðPopt
a
a
b
b
and for routing r~2 is ðPopt  Pr~2 ; Popt  Pr~2 Þ. Consider a
new routing that sends  fraction of traffic through
routing r~1 and 1   fraction through routing r~2 . Since
r, we have the new power
P~r is a linear function of ~
expenditure as   Pr~a1 þ ð1  Þ  Pr~a2 for Group A and
  Pr~b1 þ ð1  Þ  Pr~b2 for Group B. The benefit vector for
the new routing is then




a
b
 ð  Pr~a1 þ ð1  Þ  Pr~a2 ; Popt
   Pr~b1 þ ð1  Þ  Pr~b2 Þ ;
Popt
which is




a
b
a
b
 Pr~a1 ; Popt
 Pr~b1 þ ð1  Þ  Popt
 Pr~a2 ; Popt
 Pr~b2 :
  Popt
Hence, the set of feasible benefit vectors is convex.

u
t

Proof for Proposition 1. Let ~
r be a fair coalition routing and
minðB~ar ; B~br Þ < 0. Consider the routing r~1 in which each
group uses its group optimal. Then, Bar~1 ¼ 0Bbr~1 ¼ 0 and
minðB~ar ; B~br Þ < minðBar~1 ; Bbr~1 Þ. Thus, from the minimum
component property, ~
r is not a fair coalition routing,
which is a contradiction.
u
t
Proof for Theorem 2. Let ðB~ar ; B~br Þ be the benefit vector
under fair coalition routing ~
r. If the minimum is greater
that t, then all other components are also greater than t.
Hence, ~
r will result in a useful coalition.
Now, we prove the “only if” condition using contradiction. Let the minimum component of the max-min fair
benefit vector be less that t. Also, suppose a routing r~1
exists such that minðBar~1 ; Bbr~1 Þ  t. Thus, ~
r is not a fair
coalition routing from the minimum component property. This is a contradiction.
u
t
Proof for Theorem 3. Consider two Groups A and B. Let ~
r
be a fair coalition routing. Suppose that B~ar > B~br . From
Proposition 1, B~ar  0 and B~br  0. Thus, B~ar > 0 since A
benefits from the coalition it sends traffic to at least one
node in B. Now, consider a coalition routing r~ in which
Group A sends  fraction of traffic through the joint
routing ~
r and 1   fraction of traffic through its group
optimal, 0 <  < 1. B routes as in ~
r. Clearly, r~ is feasible.
0
Now, consider the links ðv; v Þ from Group A nodes
(v 2 V a ) to Group B nodes (v 2 V b ) in the joint routing.
Since, in the optimal routing, nodes in A do not route
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their traffic through the nodes in B, for each such ðv; v0 Þ,
P 
P
r ðv; v0 Þ  i rðv; v0 Þ and for some v 2 V a and v0 2 V b ,
P
Pi 
0
0
b
b
b
i r ðv; v Þ <
i rðv; v Þ. Hence, Jr~ < J~
r . Now, B~
r ¼
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
Popt  J~r and Br~ ¼ Popt  Jr~ : Since Jr~ < J~r, Br~ > B~br
for any  2 ð0; 1Þ: Since B~ar > B~br , when  is sufficiently
close to 1, Bar~ > Bbr~ , but then ~
r does not satisfy the
minimum component property. This is a contradiction.t
u
We will use the following concepts in proving
Theorem 5.
Consider a convex and continuous function f defined
on a convex set F Rk . Then, a vector w0 2 Rk is called
a subgradient of f at a point y0 2 F if it satisfies
fðyÞ  fðy0 Þ  ðw0 , y  y0 Þ8y 2 F . An interior point y0 of
F is the minimum point of f in F if and only if ~
0 belongs
to the set of subgradients at y0 .
P P
Proof for Theorem 5. Let gðvÞ ¼ i ð v0 ri ðv; v0 Þ  Oi ðvÞ 
P
00
v00 ri ðv ; vÞÞ and
X
X
zðvÞ ¼ K1 þ K
ri ðv; v0 Þdðv; v0 Þ4  BðvÞ:
i

v0 2V a [V b [fei g

P: Maximize : F ð~
r; ZÞ ¼ Z  sð~
r; ZÞ where
X
ðjgðvÞj þ maxð0; zðvÞÞÞ þ maxð0; Z  B~ar Þ
sð~
r; ZÞ ¼
v2V a [V b

þ maxð0; Z  B~br Þ:
~  ð~
~  ð~
r ; Z  Þ be the optimal solution
Let Q
r; ZÞ. Let Q

and U be the optimal value of F ð~
r; ZÞ. We prove this in
two steps. In the first step, we prove that P has the same
solution as FC for  > 1. In the second step, we prove that
the routing obtained by the iterative approach converges
to the optimal solution of P, i.e., limn!1 kr~n  r~ k ¼ 0,
where r~n is the routing obtained in the nth iteration and
~ denotes the norm of X,
~ i.e., if X  ðx1 ; x2 . . .Þ, then
kXk
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2
2
~
kXk ¼ x1 þ x2 . . .. The result follows.
~ such that sðQÞ
~ > 0. For such Q,
~ there
Step 1. Select Q
always exists a component of the subgradient that is less
than or equal to 1   and 1   is less than 0. Therefore,
~
~
0 does not belong to the set of subgradients. Hence, Q
cannot be an optimal solution for P. Therefore, all
~ for which sðQÞ
~ ¼ 0. Also, for
solutions of P involve Q
~
sðQÞ ¼ 0, the value of the objective function of FC and P
are equal. Therefore, for  > 1, any optimal solution of P
is an optimal solution of FC.
Step 2. Choose an arbitrary  > 0. Let 0 ¼ =2. For
~ : F ðQÞ
~  U   0 g.
any 0 > 0, define D0 as D0 ¼ fQ
From Theorem 27.2 [27], it follows that there exists an
 ¼ ð0 Þ > 0 such that
n
o
~ : kQ
~ Q
~ k  0 :
Q
D
ð5Þ
~n Þ <
~n 62 D . Therefore, F ðQ
Consider n, for which Q
U   :
The update equations at the nodes of Groups A and B
can be compactly stated as
~n ðv; v0 Þ þ n ~n ;
~nþ1 ðv; v0 ¼ ½Q
Q
þ
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where ~n is the subgradient of F ð~
r; ZÞ. It follows from the
definition of subgradients that
~n  Q
~ Þ  F ðQ
~n Þ  U  < :
ð~n ; Q
Now, k~n k  T , where
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T ¼ 2 2 ð1 þ L4 Þ2 N 2 þ ð2 þ 1Þ2 ;
L is the maximum distance between any two nodes, and
N is the total number of nodes in the network.
~nþ1  Q
~ k2 ¼ k½Q
~n þ n ~n  Q
~ k2
kQ
þ
~n þ n ~n  Q
~ k2
 kQ
~n  Q
~ k2 þ 2 k~n k2 þ 2n ð~n ; Q
~n  Q
~ Þ
¼ kQ
n
~n  Q
~ k2 þ T 2 2  2n :
< kQ
n

Since n ! 0, n  =T 2 when n is sufficiently large. For
all such n,
~ k2 < kQ
~n  Q
~ k2  n :
~nþ1  Q
kQ

ð6Þ

~n 62 D for all
< 1 such that Q
Suppose there exists a
n  N0 . Therefore, there exists N  N0 such that (6)
holds for all n  N . Adding the inequalities obtained
from (6) for n ¼ N to N þ m, we obtain
N0

~ k2 < kQ
~N  Q
~ k2  
~N þmþ1  Q
kQ



NX
 þm

n ;

n¼N

~ k ! 1 as m ! 1
~N þmþ1  Q
which implies that kQ

P1
since 1 n ¼ 1. This is not possible since
~ k  0:
~N þmþ1  Q
kQ

Hence, the supposition was incorrect. Hence, there exists
~n 2 D for all
a sequence n1; < n2; < . . . such that Q
i;
I ¼ 1; 2; . . . . Let i1 ¼ n1; . Since n ! 0, there exists i2 such
that n  minð0 =T ; =T 2 Þ; 8 n  ni2 ; . Let i0 ¼ maxði1 ; i2 Þ.
Consider the following cases:
~n 2 D and,
Case 1. n ¼ nj; for some j  i0 . Here, Q
~ k  0 < .
~n  Q
from (5), it follows that kQ
Case 2. n ¼ nj; þ 1 for some j  i0 . Then,
~n þ1 ¼ ½Q
~n þ n ~
~n ¼ Q
:

Q
j;
j;
j; nj; þ
Thus,
~n k ¼ k½Q
~n þ n ~
~n k
~n  Q
Q

kQ
j;
j;
j; nj; þ
j;
~n þ n ~
~n k
 kQ
n  Q
j;

j;

j;

j;

¼ nj; k~
nj; k  Unj;  0 :
~ k  0 (Case 1),
~n  Q
From the above, and since kQ
j;
we get
~ k  kQ
~n  Q
~ k þ kQ
~n  Q
~n k  0 þ 0 ¼ 20 ¼ :
~n  Q
kQ
j;
j;
Case 3. nj; þ 1 < n < njþ1; for some j  i0 . Also,
~
Qn0 62 D 8nj; < n0 < njþ1; . From (6), it follows that
~n0 þ1  Q
~ k < kQ
~n0  Q
~ k. Thus, kQ
~n  Q
~ k < kQ
~n þ1 
kQ
j;



~
~
~
~
~
Q k: Since kQn þ1  Q k   (Case 2), kQn  Q k  .
j;
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~n  Q
~ k 
From Cases 1, 2, and 3, it follows that kQ

~
~
0
 8n  ni ; : Since  is arbitrary, limn!1 kQn  Q k ¼ 0,
~  ð~
rn  r~ k ¼ 0. t
u
and since Q
r; ZÞ, we have limn!1 k~
Proof for Proposition 2. Consider the joint routing r~1 under
which 1) A and B jointly route to the exit points without
using any node in C and both groups have positive
benefits and 2) C routes optimally to the exit point
without using nodes of Groups A and B. Under r~1 ,
Group C has zero benefit and Groups A and B have
positive benefits. Such r~1 exists because the coalition
between A and B is mutually beneficial. Now, using r~1 ,
we construct a coalition routing ~
r that will make benefits
of all three groups positive. Since the coalition between B
and C is mutually beneficial, at least one node in C can
send traffic through at least one node in B. Let b1 and c1
be such a node pair. Let c1 send  fraction of its traffic to
b1, where  > 0, and 1   fraction of its traffic using its
group optimal. Now, for any  > 0 under ~
r, the benefit of
Group C will be greater than that under r~1 (as nodes in C
route less traffic under ~
r than under r~1 ) and, hence,
positive. Also, the benefits of Groups A and B under ~
r is
less than that under r~1 , as nodes in Groups A and B route
more traffic under ~
r than r~1 . But,  can be suitably
reduced to keep the benefits of Groups A and B positive.
Hence, a routing ~
r exists under which all three groups
have a positive benefit.
Proof for Theorem 6. Consider a feasible benefit
~~r such that there exists subsets y1 ; y2 . . . yk such
vector B
that for k  n, y1 [ . . . yk ¼ f1 . . . ng and the following
conditions hold:
B~ir ¼ B~jr if i, j 2 ym for each m 2 f1 . . . kg.
B~ir > B~jr i f i 2 ym a n d j 2 ym1 f o r e a c h
m 2 f2 . . . kg.
3. For any i 2 ym , while maintaining feasibility, B~ir
cannot be increased without reducing B~jr for some
j 2 y1 [ . . . ym .
~
Then, B~r is a max-min fair benefit vector.
Each stage of the linear program has a feasible
solution. Let the program yield a routing r~ and
terminate at stage k. Clearly, B~r~ is feasible. Note that
e1 [ . . . [ ek ¼ f1 . . . ng. We will show that B~r~ satisfies
the above properties with y1 ¼ e1 ; . . . ; yk ¼ ek . Note that

8 i 2 em and 1  m  k. Also, Z1 < Z2 . . . < Zk .
Bir~ ¼ Zm
Thus, Properties 1 and 2 hold. Let Property 3 not hold.

for
Then, there exists a routing r~1 such that Bir~ > Zm
j
j
some i 2 em and Br~1  Br~ for each j 2 fe1 [ . . . [ em g.

Case A. Let Bjr~1  Zm
for each j 2 femþ1 [ . . . [ ek g,
but then r~1 is a feasible solution of a substage of stage m
and, therefore, i 62 em .

Case B. Let Bjr~1 < Zm
for some j 2 femþ1 [ . . . [ ek g.
Then, we have two feasible benefit vectors B~r~1 and B~r~

such that Bjr~1  Bjr~ for each j 2 fe1 [ . . . em g, Bir~1 > Zm
,
j

and Br~ > Zm for each j 2 femþ1 [ . . . ek g.
~ ¼ B~~ þ ð1  ÞB~r~ for 0 <  < 1. Now,
Let AðÞ
1
r
~ is a feasible benefit vector. For
from Theorem 1, AðÞ
each  > 0, Aj ðÞ  Bjr~ for each j 2 fe1 [ . . . em g and


Ai ðÞ > Zm
. For  close to 1, Aj ðÞ > Zm
for each
j 2 femþ1 [ . . . ek g. Let 0 be one such . Then, like in
1.
2.
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~0 Þ is a feasible solution of a substage of stage
Case A, Að
m and i 62 em . This is a contradiction and, thus,
Property C also holds.
u
t
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